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THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN
OF DANGERS INVOLVED IN USE
OF A PRODUCT
The manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by his products is a rap-
idly developing area of the law of torts.1 Erosion of the doctrine of privity
has greatly increased the number of potential plaintiffs who can recover
from the manufacturer,2 and given added importance to this area of the
law.
Product liability rests on theories of strict liability,3 negligence' and
breach of warranty.5 This note examines one of the theories of recovery
within the area of negligence-the duty of the manufacturer to warn of
dangers involved in the use of his product. Products which are taken in-
ternally, i.e. food, drugs, beverages, etc., are not considered here because
most courts apply a theory of strict liability rather than negligence in de-
ciding these cases.' Also excluded is consideration of the duty of retailers
and distributors to warn consumers of dangers involved in use of a product,
except to observe that a distributor may be held to the same duty as the
manufacturer if he either assembles the product or markets it as his own.7
It is unrealistic to hope to manufacture a product incapable of causing
some injury, i.e. a non-dangerous product. However, a product may be
"dangerous" and yet not have been negligently produced.' Though cases
frequently label products which have caused an injury "defective"," the
term would appear to mean no more than that the product is dangerous.
Therefore, the negligence analyzed in this note is not negligence in manu-
facture or testing of the product, though such negligence may incidentally
be present in some cases. The negligence focused upon here is the failure
to give the warning the reasonably prudent manufacturer would have given.
1. W. Prosser, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
2. Id. at § 96, 662-63.
3. Id. at § 97, 672-78.
4. Id. at § 96, 658-72.
5. Id. at § 97, 678-85.
6. Id. at § 97, 674-76.
7. See King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); Poplar v.
Bourjois, 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
8. See, e.g., Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958); Martin v. Bengue,
Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
9. E.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926).
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I. WHEN THE DUTY EXISTS
[T]oday a manufacturer who undertakes to produce and sell to the
general public a product with a high risk of human harm must pro-
vide specification, instruction, and warning, so that it is reasonably
safe for ordinary persons to use it, .... "o (emphasis added).
Dangers which are characterized as inherent or imminent give rise to
the duty to warn." Inherent dangers are defined as dangers stemming from
the nature of the product, 2 e.g., noxious fumes emitted by carbon tetra-
chloride."' Imminent dangers are those arising from a defect in the manu-
facture of the product,"' e.g., a tractor which overturned because of a de-
sign defect which placed too little weight on the front wheels. " The terms
often are used in conjunction" and their independent meanings are not
always observed." Consequently, most of the cases cannot be analyzed
by application of the isolated definitions of these terms. Instead, the phrase
"inherently and imminently dangerous" often expresses the court's con-
clusion that the product subjected the user to a risk of serious harm to
himself or his property.'
Where the danger will cause only slight injury, 9 or the injury threat-
ened is not to a person or his property,2" there is no duty to warn.2 Further,
10. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 674 (D. Ore. 1963).
11. See, e.g., Larramendy v. Myres, 272 P.2d 824 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Poplar
v. Bourjois, 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
12. LaPlant v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961); see Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
13. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
14. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Altorfer Bros. Co.
v. Green, 236 Ala. 427, 183 So. 415 (1938); Biller v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 InI.
App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962); Outwater v. Miller, 3 Misc. 2d 47, 155 N.Y.S.2d
357 (Supp. Ct. 1956).
15. Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, supra note 14.
16. See cases cited in note 11, supra.
17. See Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Min. 319, 79
N.W.2d 688 (1956).
18. Schuylerville Wall Paper Co., Inc., v. American Mfg. Co., 272 App. Div. 856, 70
N.Y.S.2d 166, appeal denied, 272 App. Div. 997, 73 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1947).
19. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179
P.2d 807, (1947); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 765 (Mo. 1958).
20. Where the danger involved is economic in character, i.e. loss of profit in operation
of a business, recovery was denied. Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F.
Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955); Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General Cotton Converters, Inc.,
8 App. Div. 102, 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1959).
21. The forseeability of the type of harm that may occur, the persons who may be
subjected to the danger, the use to which the product may be put and the probability
that the harm will in fact occur are considered later in the note. Although the courts
have found that the manufacturer is under no duty to warn of dangers in some cases
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there is no duty unless the manufacturer subjectively knew or objectively
should have known of the existence of the danger." In applying the ob-
jective standard to determine whether the manufacturer should have been
aware of the danger, courts hold him to possess the knowledge of an ex-
pert 3 and require him to keep abreast of scientific discoveries relating to
his type of product.24
Even if the dangers involved in use of his product are not known to the
manufacturer at the time he puts it on the market, he may be required
to issue a warning when dangers later come to his attention." In several
cases, the manufacturer became aware of the latent danger through other
users being injured by the product.26 Although apparently no cases on the
point have been decided, failure to give a warning after the manufacturer
should reasonably have discovered the danger, even though the products
had already been marketed, may give the injured user a ground for re-
covery. The result of decisions has been to require the manufacturer to
follow his product into the hands of the consumer and warn of any dangers
which are later discovered.' The question of how long the duty exists is
as yet unanswered. Recent warnings issued by the auto industry, via mass
communications media, underscore the importance of the duty to warn of
subsequently discovered dangers and the likelihood of liability for failure
to do so.
II. DiSCHARGING THE DUTY
To discharge the manufacturer's duty, the warning must be given in such
form as would reasonably be expected to reach and alert the reasonably
prudent man who may be reasonably expected to use the product. It must
convey the nature and extent of the danger in a manner which is com-
prehensible to the average user.
falling within those areas, it is analytically sounder to consider these areas as limitations
on liability rather than as conditions precedent to imposition of a duty to warn.
22. Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 1961); Imperial v.
Central Concrete Co., 2 N.Y.2d 939, 142 N.E.2d 209, 162 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1957).
23. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 674 n.5 (D. Ore. 1963).
24. Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
25. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959);
Moberly v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965).
Note, however, that the manufacturer's duty has not been extended to warn of those
dangers which arise as a result of continued use (i.e. from ordinary wear and tear).
Ein v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ind. 1959); Auld v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1942).
26. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959);
Moberly v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965).
27. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
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A. To Whom Warning Must Be Given
The warning does not have to reach the user; it is sufficient if the means
chosen is reasonably calculated to reach him.28 Placing a label or decal,
containing the warning, on the product or its container has been held to
be a reasonable means.29 Literature, such as owners' manuals or hand-
books, which accompanies the product also has been held sufficient." Or-
dinarily a warning given to or reasonably calculated to reach the original
purchaser of the product will satisfy the duty to warn any user,3 though
there is a split of authority in cases in which the original purchaser is an
employer and the person using the product is his employee. The majority
of courts hold the warning sufficient on the theory that is is reasonable to
expect that the employer will convey the warnings he received to his em-
ployee. 2 The minority cases, which hold that it is not reasonable to expect
the employer to relay the warning, involved dangers which might result in
the user's death.3  The severity of the possible harm may have been the
decisive factor in these cases. Two courts have indicated that a retailer can
reasonably be expected to pass on warnings to a consumer, 4 though at
least one court indicated the contrary." In light of the cases discussed above
28. See McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430,
226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir.
1951). But, even in those instances in which the original purchaser has actually been
warned [by the manufacturer of the dangers involved in the use of his product] the
warning is held to be insufficient if the failure by the purchaser to pass on the warning
is reasonably forseeable by the manufacturer. For the proposition that forseeable in-
tervening negligence does not preclude liability on the part of the manufacturer see Mazzi
v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308
F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
29. Singleton v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 131 So. 2d 329 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
However, McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430,
226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962), raises doubts that a label placed on a container will be suffi-
cient in all cases. If the container is likely to be discarded the probability that the warn-
ing will reach the ultimate user is slight, the manufacturer will be liable to the un-
warned user. Id. at 69, 181 N.E. 2d at 434, 226 N.Y.S. 2d at 410 (distributor held
himself out to be the manufacturer). Placing a label on the product itself may not be
a reasonable means of conveying the warning if the label is so flimsy that it cannot be
expected to remain intact. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 239
P.2d 48, 55 (1951).
30. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966).
31. Cases cited note 28, supra.
32. E.g., Soto v. E. C. Brown Co., 283 App. Div. 896, 130 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1954).
33. E.g., Montesano v. Patent Scaffolding Co, 213 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Pa. 1962);
Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 352 Mo. 288, 177 S.W.2d 608 (1943).
34. See Victory Sparklers & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1931); El-
rod v. King, 105 Ga. App. 46, 123 S.E.2d 441, (1961).
35. See Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570
(1925).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss2/4
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
in which the courts refused to find a warning to an employer sufficient, it
is at least questionable whether such a warning would be sufficient if the
risk and extent of the harm were sufficiently great. One court has held
that a distributor cannot reasonably be expected to relay warnings to re-
tailers and ultimately to the consumer." Therefore, the warning must at
least be addressed to the next lowest link of the marketing chain for the
manufacturer to hope to escape liability.
B. Physical Aspects of Warning
In determining whether the warning could reasonably be expected to
alert the reasonably prudent man in the circumstances of its use, the courts
emphasize the conspicuousness of the warning. The warning was held in-
sufficient when it was part of a block of type-all of the same size and
color." The fact that it was preceeded by the words "safety note" was not
adequate to call the user's attention to it. Warnings placed on the back of
a label visible through the bottle,"5 or at the bottom of the narrow side of
a rectangular can were also held inadequate." However, there are pitfalls
in emphasizing the danger. One case has held that emphasis of one danger
could render accompanying warnings of other dangers inadequate. Also,
when all possible dangers are listed, the court may hold that all of the
specific warnings are lost in "a volume of verbiage that no user could be
expected to labor through, thus effectively failing as any warning at all."'0
C. Spedficity of The Warning
The warning must designate specifically all of the dangers that may cause
serious injury; a general warning that the product is dangerous is insuffi-
cient. A recent federal case points up the specificity that may be required."'
The plaintiff, a crop dusting pilot, crashed after being overcome by toxic
ingredients in a dust-defoliant. The label contained the following warn-
ings:
CAUTION Avoid inhalation of dust and contact with skin, eyes,
and clothing. Wash thoroughly with soap and water after handling and
36. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951).
37. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Bean v. Ross Mfg.
Co., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961). Cases in which only the same size type was considered
include McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430,
226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850(1955).
38. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
39. Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1955).
40. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 855, 859, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754,
757 (1963).
41. Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. S.C. 1965).
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before eating or smoking. In case of contact with skin or eyes, get
medical attention. Wear clean clothing, avoid contamination of feed
and foodstuffs.
2
The court held that the pilot was overcome by the "cumulative effects"
of inhalation and exposure and that the warning failed to warn of this
specifically. The holding may indicate an unwillingness to find warnings
sufficient on policy grounds, i.e. that the manufacturer is better able to
sustain the cost of the injury than the injured party.
It would seem the court could have held that the warning implicitly gave
notice of the danger of the type of injury suffered. Warnings of consider-
ably less specificity have been held adequate in other cases. A statement
of the chemical composition of the product has even been held adequate to
warn of dangers normally accompanying the presence of these chemicals."
Instructions which merely prescribe the procedure for efficient use of the
product and for avoiding the danger but which do not alert the user to
the danger they seek to avert, are insufficient to constitute a warning which
will enable the manufacturer to avoid liability." Ordinarily a warning
need not be accompanied by instructions, though at least a few cases have
imposed such a requirement."
42. Id. at 569.
43. See Kaempfe v. Lehn & Finks Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 202, 249 N.Y.S.
2d 840, 847 (1964), appeal dismissed, 18 N.Y.2d 784, 221 N.E.2d 809, 275 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1966). "Of course the statement that the product contained a particular sulfate [alumi-
num sulfate] was adequate to warn any and all persons who knew that they had an al-
lergy with respect to the same." Id.
44. McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953); see Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963). Contra,
E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934); see Briggs v.
National Indus., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949).
45. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963). In this case the
plaintiff had applied a weed killer containing sodium arsenite to her driveway with a
back pack, air-pressure spray pump. After finishing, she rinsed out the tank and poured
the rinse water containing the residue of the solution upon a grass covered area in her
back yard. A few days later she took a sun bath on this area and (due to an absorption
through) her skin (of the) sodium arsenite which had remained as residue she suffered
accute malfunctioning. The court held the manufacturer liable because there was no
warning or protective advice whatsoever as to the disposal of the fluid and that this
total lack of advice as to the disposal of the rinse misled the user into concluding that
there was no lingering risk after immediate use. See De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. N.Y. 1951). But see May v. Allied Chlorine & Chem. Prods.,
Inc., 168 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964). See also Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina
Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. S.C. 1965) in which the court held the manufac-
turer liable for a failure, among other things, to have listed an antidote on its label.
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D. Warning of the Extent of the Danger
The warning must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of
harm that could result from the danger:
Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of in-
tensity that would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own
safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger."
A warning that breathing the vapor from a floor cleansing product was
"harmful" and should be "avoided' was insufficient to warn of the fatal
consequences which ensued. 7 In another case the fact that it might be
common knowledge that getting paint into an eye will cause painful con-
sequences did not foreclose the need to warn that blindness might result.48
In still another case, one judge contended that is was necessary to point
out the disease that the user would contract if the warnings were not fol-
lowed. 9 It should be observed that where the extent of danger which
flows from the use of the product is such that it will be readily recognizable
to the consumer, the warning need not indicate the consequences. 0
E. Comprehensibility to the Average User
All of the previously discussed substantive requirements of a warning
are complemented by the requirements that the warning be comprehensible
to the average user. 1 The warning cannot be couched in technical lan-
guage. 2 One problem is to determine who is the "average user." Implicit
in the determination is the question of forseeability of the use to which the
product will be put, the type of person who may come into contact with
the product or may use it, and the conditions under which the product
may be used. This general problem of forseeability is dealt with under
limitations on liability, infra. For purposes of the discussion here, it is
sufficient to say that the "average user" may range from a child to an
expert, the nature of the product usually being the decisive factor. A child
46. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958).
47. Id.
48. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
49. Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 1965)
(concuring opinion).
50. Singleton v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 131 So. 2d 329, 334 (La. Ct. App.
1961).
51. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); see Haberly v.
Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958), wherein a warning label which stated that
the product contained calcium oxide was held insufficient in that it is not common
knowledge to the average user that calcium oxide is lime.
52. See Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
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may be classified as an "average user" for a product such as a firecracker. 3
Conversely, a special type shell for use in testing shotguns was marketed
with warnings sufficient to average users, defined by the court as arms
manufacturers and dealers in shells, a highly skilled group. 4 If the product
is manufactured for a special purpose and that purpose is evident on the
face of the product or is otherwise brought to the attention of the user,
then the warning need be comprehensible only to the intended users.55
F. Patent Dangers
The law has recognized the fact that some products are so obviously, or
patently, dangerous that they carry their own warning. As one court ob-
served, "a man knows he may be stuck by a pin."5 The doctrine proceeds
on the theory that "no one needs notice of what he already knows."5" In
those instances when the injured person had actual knowledge of the
danger, the failure to warn could not factually have been the cause of the
injury. Therefore, the doctrine is most significant in those cases in which
the court holds that the danger should have been obvious to the average
user. The question for the court to determine is whether the manufacturer
could reasonably expect that the user will realize the danger. 8 Apparently
the requisites of a sufficient warning for patent dangers must be satisfied
to answer this question in the affirmative-i.e. the nature and extent of
the danger must be obvious and understandable to the average user. Courts
have held that there is no duty to warn that a cleaning agent will injure
the eye,59 but there is a duty to warn that getting paint in the eye will cause
blindness.6" It is common knowledge that a vaporizer with a loose fitting
lid may be pulled over by a child and scald him,61 but a manufacturer must
warn that floor wax could poison a child who consumes it." The un-
guarded rollers of a bailing machine63 are a patent danger; and the
dangers of household items have been held to be in the realm of common
knowledge because of their frequent use by housewives."
53. Victory Sparklers & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1931).
54. Harper v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (1935), a§'d,
272 N.Y. 675, 290 N.Y.S. 130 (1936).
55. See Smith v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1957); Harper v.
Remington Arms Co., Inc., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (1935).
56. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id. at 29.
59. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946).
60. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
61. Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951).
62. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
63. Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948).
64. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946).
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III. CAUSATION
Even though the manufacturer has a duty to warn the consumer of the
dangerous propensities of his product and breaches this duty either by
failing to supply any warning or by failing to supply a sufficient warning,
the consumer cannot recover unless he establishes a causal relationship be-
tween the breach and the injuries he subsequently suffers. Causation, how-
ever, is relatively easy for the consumer to establish. Apparently all he
need show is a subjective state of mind indicating that he would have been
more cautious if a sufficient warning had been given 6 -a requirement
which, in effect, relegates the problem of establishing causation to a show-
ing of disproof by the manufacturer. In fact, few cases have held for the
manufacturer on this point.6
IV. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
There is a dearth of cases in which the defense of contributory negligence
has been advanced by a manufacturer or seriously considered by a court.
The few instances in which the plaintiff's negligence was obviously a con-
tributing cause of the harm may indicate, however, that the defense will
not be favored. In one case, a workman was injured when a scaffold col-
lapsed. If it had been constructed properly, the injury would not have
occured. However, the plaintiff had erected it in a manner which violated
existing safety codes. The court ignored the possibility of relieving the
manufacturer of liability on grounds of contributory negligence. The opin-
ion is unclear as to whether the defense was not pleaded or the court sum-
marily rejected it. However, it would seem that if the court favored such
a defense, it would probably have at least felt compelled to discuss it.
Courts have uniformly refused to relieve the defendant of liability, via the
doctrine of intervening cause, when an intermediate vendee negligently fails
to discover the dangerous propensity of a product."8 It is not unlikely that
the court would grant relief to a plaintiff who failed to discover the danger
and was injured."
V. LimITrTIONS ON LIABILITY
Although the manufacturer has breached the duty to warn, and this
breach factually has caused or contributed to the resulting harm, he is not
65. See Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
66. But see Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Pierce, 271 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1954).
67. Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963).
68. McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 71, 181 N.E.2d 430,
435, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 413-14 (1962).
69. Id.
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liable if the plaintiff or the injury were not forseeable, or if the negligence
of a third party intervened.
A. The Unforseeable Plaintiff
The manufacturer is liable for injuries suffered by forseeable users,"
persons he should anticipate will be in the "forseeable zone of danger"
during the use of the product," and those persons he reasonably should
anticipate will come into contact with the product.72
1. Users
Users are that class of persons who, "within the reasonable contempla-
tion of the manufacturer, are expected to use the product in question."7 "
The question is which uses-and consequently which users-can be
anticipated or forseen. Except in the relatively few instances in which a
product is manufactured and suitable for use only for a special purpose,"
the scope of the forseeable use is broad.7
2. Within the Forseeable Zone of Danger during the Use
The fact that the courts liberally define the forseeable use of the product
establishes a broad foundation for determining which persons can reason-
ably be anticipated to be within the zone of danger during that use. In
answering the question, the courts also consider the environment in which
the product will be used. Based upon these considerations, one court re-
fused to limit liability in the case of a child who drank furniture polish
which his mother had been using,"6 while another court held a manufac-
turer liable to a construction worker who suffered skin injuries from fumes
which arose when two other workers ignited a "dope pot"Y. It is reason-
able to anticipate in the first case that a child will come into contact with
a household product and in the latter case that non-using workmen will
be in the vicinity of a "dope pot" when a roofing operation is underway.
3. Persons Who Come Into Contact With the Product
Courts have held that the manufacturer should reasonably have antici-
pated that certain persons will come into contact with a product, and thus
70. Starr v. Koppers Co., 398 S.W.2d 827,830-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1963).
73. Smith v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1957).
74. Harper v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (1935), aff'd,
272 N.Y. 675, 290 N.Y.S. 130 (1936).
75. See Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963).
76. Spruill v. Bolye-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
77. Starr v. Koppers Co., 398 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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be subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm, even though they will not be
users or within the zone of danger during use. The manufacturer should
reasonably have forseen that workmen will handle the product, or its con-
tainer, while it is being transported to the ultimate user, in preparing for
its use, or in disposing of it. Thus, a manufacturer was held liable for der-
matitis suffered by a workman caused by fertilizer coming into contact with
his skin when a bag broke open as he loaded it onto a trucks.7  Liability
was also imposed when a housewife suffered injuries sunbathing on grass
where she had previously disposed of a weed killer. 9
B. Unforseeable Injuries
The manufacturer is liable only for those injuries he could reasonably
anticipate or forsee would occur.80 Therefore, the issue is which injuries
may be reasonably anticipated. It is clear that he normally will not be
liable for serious injuries suffered when only minor injuries were reasonably
anticipated,8" for injuries which are not likely to occur from use or handling
of the product, 2 for rare types of injuries which occur," or for injuries
from unforseen uses."
1. Which Injuries Are Reasonably Forseeable?
Many of the same considerations applied to determine the forseeability
of the plaintiff are equally crucial to determination of forseeability of harm.
The manufacturer must consider the injuries that could flow from the
78. Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963).
79. Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963).
80. McClanahan v. California-Spray Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953).
81. See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
82. Grau v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 324 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1963); Bonowski v.
Revlon Inc., 25 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1959) (1 complaint out of 5,304,272 bottles
of sun tan lotion sold); Moran v. Insurance Co. of North America, 146 So. 2d 4 (La. Ct.
App. 1962) (1 complaint out of 433,047 tubes of sun tan lotion sold); Bennett v. Pilot
Prods. Co., 235 P.2d 525 (Utah 1951) (1 out of 1,000 suffered allergy from hair solu-
tion). In all of these cases liability was denied on the grounds that the defendant manu-
facturer could not be charged with knowledge of the dangers involved in the use of
his product and therefore was under no duty to warn the consumer.
83. Bish v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 236 F.2d 62, 69 (5th Cir. 1956);
Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 200, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840,
845 (1964), appeal dismissed, 18 N.Y.2d 784, 221 N.E.2d 809, 275 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1966).
84. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 185 F. Supp. 751, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1960). "The de-
fendant contends that operation without the guard was a use for which the machine
was never intended, and the manufacturer is relieved by law from liability from acci-
dents resulting from such use. However, to relieve a manufacturer of liability from negli-
gent use, it must be so remote from that intended as to be unforseen by him."
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dangerous propensities of his product in the light of the use to which he can
anticipate his product will be put, the environment in which this use will
occur, the type of person who will be subjected to the danger, the manner
in which persons will handle or otherwise come into contact with the prod-
uct, and the amount of danger to third persons near the user.
Courts have gone to great lengths to find the injury forseeable in
light of these considerations. For example, one court considered the en-
vironment and type of person likely to use the product in holding a manu-
facturer liable for injuries to a crop dusting pilot who crashed after being
overcome by inhalation and exposure to a dust-defoliant.8 5 Since the home
is the obvious environment for use of furniture wax, a manufacturer was held
liable for chemical pneumonia suffered by a child who drank the wax-
apparently on the theory that it is forseeable that household products will
come into the hands of a child and that children sometimes consume nox-
ious liquids."8 In another case, liability was imposed for dermatitis suf-
fered by a workman when a bag containing fertilizer broke during load-
ing-ostensibly because it was forseeable that the chemical would come into
contact with a person's skin in use or handling."' Liability has been im-
posed on the theory that it is forseeable that noxious fumes from a "dope
pot" can injure workmen,88 and that a storage drum filled with acid may
burst causing its lid to strike a workman.89.
The term "use" may even be broad enough to encompass "misuse" of
the product in instances where the misuse should have been anticipated.
Custom of the trade in which the product will be used is the criterion for
expanding forseeability of harm into the area of misuse."0 The manufac-
turer of a scaffold was held liable for injuries to a workman9 which oc-
cured because the scaffold was erected in a faulty manner. The court
based its holding on the fact that the faulty manner of construction, which
was a violation of existing safety standards, was a general custom of the
trade. However, unless the manufacturer has actual knowledge of the
custom or it is so general that a manufacturer is charged with notice, the
harm is not forseeable.92 It would seem that ordinarily a misuse of the
product should take the resultant injury out of the realm of forseeable
85. Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
86. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
87. Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963).
88. Starr v. Koppers Co., Inc., 398 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
89. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951).
90. See Mazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Swaney v. Peden
Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963).
91. Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963).
92. McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
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injuries-or render the manufacturer free from liability because of the
intervening negligence of the injured person. In one case, a woman who
suffered skin injuries in using a hair preparation was denied recovery on
grounds, inter alia, that the injury would not have occurred if she had used
the product as directed.9" This would seem to be a legitimate restriction of
the concept of forseeable use. Courts have also restricted the scope of
anticipated use where the product is manufactured and suitable for use
only for a special purpose and the user is put on notice of the special pur-
pose. 4 Any other use of the product might be considered a misuse-or at
any rate an unforseeable use.9"
2. Remote Possibilities
The term "reasonably forseeable" does not encompass that which is only
remotely possible' or within the "far reaches of the pessimistic imagina-
tion"." The law does not hold the manufacturer liable for extraordinary
consequences. Consequently the manufacturer is not liable for severe in-
juries when he should have expected that the plaintiff would only be sub-
jected to the risk of minor injuries, or for injuries that are so unusual that
they could only have been forseen as unlikely eventualities.
Courts have refused to impose liability on manufacturers for a detached
retina when the manufacturer should have expected the user to suffer no
more serious injury than a black eye.99 In another case, the heel of a
woman's shoe broke as she was descending a flight of stairs causing her to
suffer various severe injuries.99 The court held that "the heel of a shoe
is not such an article that is reasonably certain to place life or limb in
peril"' 9 As another court has stated:
A lead pencil can stab a man to the heart or puncture his jugular
vein.., but if a person accidentally slips and falls on a pencil point in
his pocket, the manufacturer of the pencil is not liable for the injury.'01
93. Briggs v. National Indus., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949).
94. See Harper v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y.S. 862 (1935),
aff'd, 272 N.Y. 675, 290 N.Y.S. 130 (1936).
95. Id.
96. Bish v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 236 F.2d 62, 69 (5th Cir. 1956);
Kaemfe v. Lehn & Finks Prods. Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 197, 200, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840,
845 (1964), appeal dismissed, 18 N.Y.2d 784, 221 N.E.2d 809, 275 N.Y.S.2d 268
(1966); see Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 103, 179 P.2d 807, 811
(1947).
97. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
98. Id.
99. Poplar v. Bourjois, 298 N.Y.62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
100. Id. at 66, 80 N.E. 2d at 336.
101. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. ), cert denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957).
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Therefore, although in fact the manufacturer may have forseen that these
eventualities could occur, they are too unusual for the law to hold them to
be within the range of forseeable injuries.
A caveat should be added, however. The fact that the number of per-
sons who will be harmed is small, or that the product has been used for a
substantial time by the public without any injuries occuring will not in-
evitably result in the court's holding an injury unforseeable."'0 If there is a
substantial likelihood that even a small number will be subjected to a sub-
stantial probability of injury, even in cases involving very rare allergies,"0 3
the injury is held to be forseeable. A manufacturer who knows there is a
danger of injury cannot rely on the fact that no injuries have occurred to
escape liability.' Finally, it should be noted that courts apparently are
less willing to find very serious injuries or death unforseeable than mod-
erate or petty injuries."'
C. Intervening Causes
As was pointed out earlier, most courts hold that the manufacturer sat-
isfies the duty to warn by issuing the warning in a manner reasonably cal-
culated to reach the ultimate user.'" The fact that the warning failed to
reach the user has no effect on imposition of liability in these cases. A
minority of courts reach substantially the same result via a different theo-
retical route-the doctrine of intervening negligence of a third party.
Therefore, when the warning reached the retailer,"'r an original pur-
102. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
103. Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963); Wright v. Carter Prods.,
Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (defendant manufacturer knew aluminum sulfate was
an irritant even though only 373 complaints out of 82,000,000 jars of deodorant sold);
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Ct., 124 Cal. App. 2d 157, 268 P.2d 199 (1954);
Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958) (defendant manufacturer had
sold 50,000,000 packages of hair dye without compliant but it contained a known sensi-
tizer). Contra, Merril v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
104. Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
105. See Tingey v. E. F. Houghton & Co., 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947).
106. See notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text.
107. Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Latimer, 53 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1931). Here
a small child ingested a firecracker which contained a poisonous substance. The manu-
facturer was held liable for failing to warn the child or retailer of the presence of said
poison. The court said that if the retailer had received knowledge of the poisonous
character then no recovery could have been had against the manufacturer, the retailer's
negligence in failing to pass on the warning having supervened the manufacturer's negli-
gence. See Elrod v. King, 105 Ga. App. 46, 49, 123 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1961) in which
it was held that if "the defect is discovered later by one under a duty to repair the
defect or give warning of it [in this instance a retail installer of a heating system], this
discovery will insulate the manufacturer from any damages resulting from its manufacture
of a latently defective machine." But see Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler,
208 Ky. 507, 271 S.W. 570 (1925).
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chaser,"°' or the employer of an injured workman0 0 the manufacturer has
escaped liability by pleading that the negligence of the intervening party
in failing to relay the warning was the cause of the injury. There are no
cases allowing the manufacturer to escape liability by pleading that he
warned a distributor and that the distributor failed to relay the warning."'
It would seem that if the user is warned, then third parties within the for-
seeable zone of danger cannot recover from the manufacturer because the
user's negligent failure to relay the warning to the third parties is the in-
tervening cause of the harm.11 Whether the majority of courts would in
fact follow this reasoning is, at best, a matter of conjecture.
While courts have been willing to relieve the manufacturer of liability
by labeling the failure to relay the warning as a superceding cause, they
have been unwilling to do so when the intervening party failed to discover
the danger and no warning or an inadequate warning had been given by
the manufacturer. 12 In at least one case, the contributory negligence
of the injured workman in erecting a scaffold in a manner which violated
safety codes was either not pleaded or was ignored by the court in holding
the manufacturer liable for failing to warn of dangers present from his
product in constructing the scaffold in this manner." 3 This probably in-
dicates an unwillingness on the part of the court to relieve the manufac-
turer of the duty to warn-apparently a not uncommon attitude.
CONCLUSION
The great bulk of cases involving the duty to warn have been decided
within the past decade-indicating the growing acceptance and importance
of this theory in the overall field of product liability. It would appear to
give an important tool to the plaintiff who has been injured by a product,
because it offers a ground for recovery which is broader than the theory
of negligence in manufacture. It may also offer a ground for recovery
where disclaimers have restricted the ability of the plaintiff to proceed on
108. Ford Motor Co. v. Atcher, 310 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); McLaughlin
v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962).
But, even in those instances in which the original purchaser has actually been warned
by the manufacturer of the dangers involved in the use of his product, the warning is
held to be insufficient if the failure by the purchaser to pass on the warning is reason-
ably forseeable by him. See, Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
109. Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1958).
110. See Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951).
111. See Starr v. Koppers Co., 398 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
112. McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226
N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962).
113. Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963).
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a theory of breach of express or implied warranties. Even where the plain-
tiff has the option of proceeding on a theory of negligence in manufacture
of the product, proof of the breach of the duty to warn may be a more
attractive route to recovery. The plaintiff is not faced with the difficulty
in discovering the negligent conduct that occurred in a complex manu-
facturing process or in relying, in the alternative, on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor. Instead, he proves that the product is capable of causing
serious injury, i.e. that it is imminently and inherently dangerous, a fact
that is probably painfully obvious. He then proves that he received no
adequate or sufficient warning. The proof in such a case obviously is fairly
easy to gather and is readily available. Therefore, it is reasonable to pre-
dict that plaintiffs will turn to this ground of recovery more often in the
future. The increased number of cases decided during the recent years
would seem to support this.
The net result of establishment of the duty to warn as a major
weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal would seem to be an increase in the
scope and likelihood of the manufacturer's product liability. It places
a heavy burden on the manufacturer to discover those dangers which
are present in the use of or contact with his product and to convey
a sufficient notice of these dangers to the public. Because he is charged
with the knowledge of an expert, the manufacturer must keep abreast
of scientific discoveries relating to his product. He has been held re-
sponsible for dangers discovered after the product was placed on the
market and sold to consumers---forcing him to follow the product and warn
the present owners. This would not seem an unfair burden to place on the
manufacturer in today's economy. The manufacturer is most familiar
with his product and therefore in the best position to discover dangers. It
would not appear to be unfair to require him to keep abreast of develop-
ments in the field, and it is likely that a manufacturer of any size is going
to do this anyway in order to effectively compete with other companies.
The manufacturer is usually able either to spread the loss among his cus-
tomers by a slight increase in price or to insure against the loss and spread
the cost of the premium to his customers through a price increase. Finally,
the consumer in today's economy is ill-equipped to detect latent defects and
must rely on the knowledge and good faith of the manufacturer to produce
a safe product or to point out the dangers he should be aware of in its use.
The duty to warn seems to be an adequate means of assuring the con-
sumer's safety.
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